LARGE CAP FUNDAMENTAL VALUE

MARKET COMMENTARY

The S&P 500 Index returned +8.9% in the third quarter of 2020 and is now in positive territory year-to-date (+5.6%). Two-thirds of S&P 500 companies beat consensus revenue expectations and 85% exceeded earnings expectations. Corporate America's strong showing trumped continued worries about the prevalence of COVID-19 and Congress' stalemate over a new stimulus package. Meanwhile, the Fed continues to signal easy monetary policy for the foreseeable future, maintaining a subdued economic outlook. COVID-19 cases reaccelerated for the first time in months, but hospitalizations and deaths remained downward trending—there was a large jump in tests administered which could explain the mixed developments.

Growth outperformed value across geographies and across market capitalizations. Based on information from the Kenneth French/Dartmouth data library, value has underperformed growth over the last 10 years by the largest magnitude on record. Also, for the first time in the nearly 100-year old dataset, growth has outperformed value over a 20-year period. This has led to a colossal divergence in valuations. Apple, for example, is a very good business, with a great balance sheet, an iconic brand, and a loyal customer base. For *half* the price of Apple, however, you could buy *all* the banks in the S&P 500. The bank group (again, at half the price) generated more than twice the revenue and twice the earnings of Apple. For the price of Tesla, you could buy the next four largest global auto manufacturers and have money left over. Tesla generated revenue last year of $25 billion and the other four autos generated revenue of $743 billion; Tesla's earnings were negative while the other four autos generated $38 billion in earnings. $38 billion in *earnings* compared to $25 billion in *revenue* seems like a better option at the same price, let alone a discount.

Perhaps more important to our client base than the value-growth dichotomy is the equally noteworthy divergence within value, both in terms of trailing performance and future opportunity. The strongest performers within value have been concentrated in market segments with low correlations to economic growth, like healthcare and consumer staples. The weakest performers within value have been concentrated in market segments where near-term forward earnings estimates have declined meaningfully, in some cases by 30% or more. Financials, energy, and cyclical industrials comprise a disproportionate share of these examples. The positions we have in these areas have underperformed, though we view the forthcoming earnings declines as temporary. A year or two of depressed earnings reduces our intrinsic value estimate, but this impairment of value is certainly not commensurate with actual share price declines. We are unwilling to take meaningful balance sheet risk because a weak balance sheet can significantly impair capital via shareholder dilution or worse. This steadfast risk aversion allows us to tolerate temporary earnings volatility and take advantage when market values decline more than intrinsic values. We remain selective, however, and recognize that certain market segments and/or individual companies may not recover—we look to avoid businesses with uncertain long-term outlooks or insurmountable secular pressures.

Financials represent the portfolio's largest absolute weight, largest relative weight, and largest detractor to relative performance. Banks represent the portfolio's largest exposure within financials. Earnings estimates have declined due to the combination of increased loan loss provisions, a ban on share repurchases, slower asset growth, and lower interest rates. Accounting rules require banks to estimate loan losses upfront based on prevailing economic conditions. The substantial provisions taken during the first half of 2020 could end up being too high considering the severity of the economic outlook at the time. Banks' balance sheets were quite healthy entering 2020, as substantial capital had been built in the previous decade. The provisions already taken combined with the excess capital—not to mention the pre-provision income being generated—provides a meaningful cushion to absorb elevated credit losses. Further, banks' business models are less interest rate sensitive than generally believed. The large money center banks have diverse revenue streams, some of which have little/no interest rate sensitivity. For less-diversified banks, the net interest margin is more closely tied to the yield spread earned on loans than it is from the rate sensitive benefit they get from funding a portion of their earning assets with non-interest bearing liabilities. The banks' benefit of free funding dissipates as rates decline, but the yield spread on loans exhibits countercyclical traits (i.e. the yield spread often widens when rates decline as banks tighten lending standards). This has resulted in relatively stable net interest margins over the past decade despite persistently falling interest rates over that period.

The dichotomy between growth and value is significant and pervasive, but so too are the opportunities within value. The portfolio's active share relative to the value benchmark is at its highest level in at least a decade, and our valuation discount to the value benchmark is near record levels. This reflects our conviction that select opportunities are exceptionally attractive. The recent environment has not been conducive to our approach, but we are confident that patient investors will be rewarded by the rarely observed risk-adjusted potential of the current portfolio.

ATTRIBUTION – 3Q20

The Hotchkis & Wiley Large Cap Fundamental Value portfolio (gross and net of management fees) underperformed the Russell 1000 Value Index in the third quarter of 2020. The portfolio's value-focused approach hurt relative performance as the most deeply discounted stocks underperformed. For example, index stocks trading at a discount to book value lagged the overall index by about 10 percentage points in the quarter; the portfolio had about one-third of the portfolio invested in such stocks compared to just 10 percent for the Russell 1000 Value. Stock selection in financials, along with the overweight allocation and stock selection in energy detracted from performance. Positive stock selection in technology and industrials helped. The largest detractors to relative performance in the quarter were AIG, Citigroup, General Electric, National Oilwell Varco, and Hess; the largest positive contributors were FedEx, Cummins, Corning, General Motors, and TE Connectivity.

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LARGE CAP FUNDAMENTAL VALUE

LARGEST NEW PURCHASES – 3Q20

Baker Hughes is one of the largest oilfield services companies and has expertise in gas turbines and industrial digital solutions. The combined impact of COVID-19 on demand and the Saudi/Russian surge in production have created severe dislocations throughout energy markets. Given Baker Hughes' investment grade balance sheet, strong liquidity position, and technological expertise, it is well positioned to weather the cycle while providing upside in an eventual recovery. Baker Hughes trades at a low multiple of normal earnings considering the size and quality of its businesses.

Composite performance is available at www.hwcm.com, located on the strategy's Performance tab. Returns discussed can differ from actual portfolio returns due to data differences, cash flows, trading, and other activity. Portfolio characteristics and attribution based on representative Large Cap Fundamental Value portfolio. Certain client portfolio(s) may or may not hold the securities discussed due to each account's guideline restrictions, cash flow, tax and other relevant considerations. Equity performance attribution is an analysis of the portfolio's return relative to a selected benchmark, is calculated using daily holdings information and does not reflect management fees and other transaction costs and expenses. For the portfolio's total performance attribution, interaction effect is combined with stock selection. Specific securities identified are the largest contributors (or detractors) to the portfolio's performance relative to the Russell 1000 Value Index. Other securities may have been the best and worst performers on an absolute basis. The "Largest New Purchases" section includes the three largest new security positions during the quarter/year based on the security's quarter/year-end weight adjusted for its relative return contribution; does not include any security received as a result of a corporate action; if fewer than three new security positions during the quarter/year, all new security positions are included. Securities identified do not represent all of the securities purchased or sold for advisory clients and are not indicative of current or future holdings or trading activity. H&W has no obligation to disclose purchases or sales of the securities. No assurance is made that any securities identified, or all investment decisions by H&W were or will be profitable. The value discipline used in managing accounts in the Large Cap Diversified Value strategy may prevent or limit investment in major stocks in the S&P 500 and Russell 1000 Value and returns may not be correlated to the indexes.

Quarterly characteristics and portfolio holdings are available at www.hwcm.com, located on the strategy's Characteristics and Literature tabs. For a list showing every holding's contribution to the overall account's performance and portfolio activity for a given time period, please contact H&W at hotchkisandwiley@hwcm.com. Portfolio information is subject to the firm's portfolio holdings disclosure policy.

Style Risk: A value-oriented investment approach involves the risk that value stocks may remain undervalued or may not appreciate in value as anticipated. Value stocks can perform differently from the market as a whole or from other types of stocks and may be out of favor with investors and underperform growth stocks for varying periods of time. Growth investing tends to work well during speculative, momentum-driven markets, while value investing tends to work well following recessionary periods. Value stocks following a recession may start from a lower market value than growth stocks which can contribute to their outperformance. Past recessions and recoveries cannot predict future performance due to different factors and circumstances. Companies identified are for illustrative purposes and should not be considered investment advice.

Market Disruption: The recent global coronavirus pandemic has caused and continues to cause disruption in the global economy, unprecedented business and travel disruption and extreme fluctuations in global capital and financial markets. H&W is unable to predict the consequences of the upheaval caused by coronavirus pandemic, which, depending on the severity and the length of the outbreak, has the potential to negatively impact the firm's investment strategies and reduce available investment opportunities.

All investments contain risk and may lose value. The commentary is for information purposes only and should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Portfolio managers' opinions and data included in this commentary are as of September 30, 2020 and are subject to change without notice. Any forecasts made cannot be guaranteed. Information obtained from independent sources is considered reliable, but H&W cannot guarantee its accuracy or completeness. Certain information presented is based on proprietary or third-party estimates, which are subject to change and cannot be guaranteed. Equity securities may have greater risks and price volatility than U.S. Treasuries and bonds, where the price of these securities may decline due to various company, industry and market factors. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.