MID-CAP VALUE

COMPOSITE PERFORMANCE (%) ANNUALIZED

	QTR	YTD	1 Yr	3 Yr	5 Yr	10 Yr	Inception
H&W Mid-Cap Value (gross)	5.61	18.58	21.71	13.98	12.90	10.47	12.33
H&W Mid-Cap Value (net)	5.42	17.92	20.81	13.14	12.10	9.75	11.51
Russell Mid-Cap Value Index	-1.98	15.25	16.89	17.50	9.26	9.93	10.25

Commencement of MCV Composite: 1/1/97. Net performance results are presented after actual management fees and all trading expenses but before custodial fees; the composite includes all Mid-Cap Value discretionary accounts. Additional disclosures provided in GIPS Report.

MARKET COMMENTARY

The Russell Midcap Index declined 3.0% in the third quarter of 2026, though it remains up 11.8% year-to-date. The Russell Midcap Value Index held up better than the Russell Midcap Growth Index, declining 2.0% vs. 5.8%, respectively, extending its considerable year-to-date edge: +15.3% vs. +1.0%, respectively. Mid caps lagged large caps, as the S&P 500 Index returned +2.3%. Large cap's outperformance was largely attributable to its exposure to mega cap tech and greater insulation from the considerable rise in interest rates. Market leadership continued to be narrow. Only 40% of the Russell Midcap Value's constituents outperformed the index, and the median stock declined 5.8%.

S&P 500 quarterly earnings grew more than 30% year-over-year, an exceptional pace for a non-recessionary recovery. This strength appeared to overshadow renewed conflict in the Middle East and the Federal Reserve's first rate hike in more than three years. The collapse of the US/Iran ceasefire and the subsequent campaign of tanker attacks near the Strait of Hormuz sent oil prices higher. Brent crude rose 45% to $104/barrel in the quarter. Dated Brent, a better proxy than futures for the price of a physical barrel, spiked 68% to $120/barrel. The energy sector of the Russell Midcap Value returned +11% in the quarter. The portfolio benefited from its overweight position, coupled with strong outperformance within the sector.

The Consumer Price Index rose 3.4% year-over-year in its most recent reading, lower than its May peak but still well above the Fed's target. Accordingly, the Federal Reserve raised the federal funds rate by 25 basis points to 4.00% (upper bound) in September, and the futures market is pricing in another hike of that magnitude before year end. Long-term Treasury yields rose even more. The 10-year climbed from 4.5% to 5.3%, its highest level since 2007, and the 30-year yield ended the quarter at 5.6%, its highest since 2002. Predictably, rate-sensitive sectors like utilities and real estate declined. The 30-year mortgage rate also rose meaningfully, eclipsing 7%. The University of Michigan's Consumer Sentiment Index fell very close to its lowest level in the history of the survey, which dates back to the late 1970s, presumably fueled by the increased cost of living. Consumer discretionary stocks performed poorly, declining 8% in the value index.

After a spectacular run, enthusiasm for all things AI paused. The Philadelphia Semiconductor Index declined 11% in the quarter, and 14% from its late June peak. It was down even more in July before recovering in the latter part of the quarter. Semiconductor stocks in the Russell Midcap Value fared worse, declining 21%. Uncertainty about how the AI buildout will be financed appeared to grow. Chair Warsh cited competition for capital from the largest AI data center spenders as one reason for higher long-term yields, and in late September Oracle issued a force majeure notice on a large data center project.

Software was one of the better performing industries in the value index, returning +20%. We have long believed that the market overstated the threat AI poses to software companies with mission critical systems of record. The evidence this year—improving bookings, stable to accelerating organic growth, and sizable share repurchases—continues to undermine the so-called "SaaSpocalypse" theory. Even after the rebound, select software companies remain attractively valued. Workday, for example, trades at 14x our estimate of normal earnings, compared to 16x for the Russell Midcap Value and 24x for the S&P 500. It also has excellent fundamental risk ratings and is consequently our second largest holding.

The quarter also brought a meaningful change in market disposition. In the first half of the year, high beta and high momentum stocks dominated, while value and quality lagged. In the third quarter, this largely reversed, with value and quality coming back into vogue. A single quarter does not mark the end of a speculative cycle, and we expect periods of exuberance to recur. Still, the third quarter was a reminder that valuation and fundamentals eventually matter. We believe our portfolio of high quality, attractively valued, financially sound businesses is well positioned as that reality reasserts itself.

(continued)

The specific investments shown are for informational purposes only and represent the top contributors and detractors for the relevant performance time period. The selection criteria used to determine the top contributors and detractors remains the same across performance measurement periods; additional disclosures provided in Endnotes.

Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

Hotchkis & Wiley

MID-CAP VALUE

ATTRIBUTION ANALYSIS – 3Q26

The Mid-Cap Value portfolio outperformed the Russell Midcap Value Index in the third quarter of 2026 (gross and net of fees). Positive stock selection in industrials, technology energy, and communication services drove the outperformance. The overweight position in energy also helped. Among the largest headwinds was the index reconstitution. The late June reconstitution closely coincided with the peak of semiconductors and other AI spending beneficiaries, many of which left the Russell Midcap Value and then proceeded to decline. The timing of the reconstitution was fortunate for passive value investors but dampened our relative performance. We estimate that the portfolio would have outperformed more than it did had the index remained unchanged. The reconstitution had no effect, of course, on our absolute return. Health care was the largest sector detractor, as the benchmark's biotechnology and life sciences tools stocks rallied sharply. Stock selection in financials and materials also detracted.

LARGEST INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTORS – 3Q26

Workday is a leader in cloud software for back-office business functions, spanning human capital management, financial management, and adjacent enterprise resource planning (ERP) products, with 60% of the Fortune 500 as human capital management customers. Its formidable competitive advantages produce best-in-class unit economics — 97% gross retention, a 38% normal EBIT margin, and low-teens subscription revenue growth — and its ERP markets are both the largest and least cloud-penetrated in application software, providing a long runway to invest at high returns at an attractive valuation. In mid-August, Reuters reported Silver Lake was in talks to acquire Workday, which boosted its stock price. We trimmed the position on strong performance.

WPP is one of the world's largest ad agency holding companies. The stock outperformed during Q3 as first half results exceeded expectations and the decline among its largest clients moderated. Recent wins with Estée Lauder, JLR, and Heineken also suggested early traction from the new CEO's restructuring plan.

APA is an independent oil and gas exploration and production operating in the Midland and Delaware basins in the Permian and Egypt. APA offers strong free cash flow generation driven by favorable natural gas price differentials and underappreciated reinvestment opportunities in Suriname, Egypt, and potentially Alaska. The stock outperformed during Q3 after August results highlighted Permian efficiency, and strong free cash flow supporting debt paydown and buybacks, with management guiding to substantial additional share repurchases through year-end. We believe structural cost improvements and favorable pipeline and liquefied natural gas contracts support continued cash generation, while progress in Alaska increases its potential contribution to normal earnings. Our investment thesis remains intact.

LARGEST INDIVIDUAL DETRACTORS – 3Q26

Moderna and Phillips 66 were notable detractors, because we did not own them and they returned +175% and +52%, respectively, as constituents of our benchmark. Below are the largest detractors held in the portfolio.

Olin is the largest global producer of chlor-alkali chemicals and chlorine derivatives, and also owns the Winchester ammunition brand. It is significantly underearning today due to below-normal commodity prices and demand, but a tightening five-plus year supply/demand outlook in North American chlor-alkali should drive a pricing and volume recovery. Prices for caustic soda and certain chlorine derivatives, important drivers of Olin's revenue, declined during the period. The pending merger with Huntsman should also reduce risk over the intermediate term through synergy capture and deleveraging.

SLM Corp originates more than half of all private student loans in the U.S. and trades at a low multiple of our estimate of normal earnings. The stock reversed some of its recent gains after net interest income declined, as the timing and size of prior loan sales left SLM with elevated liquidity and a lower mix of higher-yielding loans. We expect the earning-asset mix to normalize in future periods. Management continued repurchasing shares, and our thesis remains intact.

NRG Energy is a leading integrated US power company with generation and retail electricity businesses. We own it for its durable cash generation and meaningful shareholder returns. The stock underperformed during Q3 as Texas's audit of data center interconnection requests raised concerns about project delays. Softer demand projections also have NRG tracking below expectations, but management reaffirmed its full-year outlook and capital allocation plans. We believe the core business fundamentals remain intact, and its bring-your-own-power pipeline could provide earnings upside if projects materialize.

The specific investments shown are for informational purposes only and represent the top contributors and detractors for the relevant performance time period. The selection criteria used to determine the top contributors and detractors remains the same across performance measurement periods; additional disclosures provided in Endnotes.

Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

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Endnotes:

Portfolio managers' opinions and data included in this commentary are as of September 30, 2026. Any discussion or view of a security, an asset class/segment, industry/sector and/or investment type are not investment recommendations, should not be assumed to be profitable, and are subject to change without notice. All investments contain risk and may lose value.

Portfolio characteristics and attribution are based on a representative Mid-Cap Value portfolio. The representative portfolio is used for informational purposes only, does not predict future portfolio characteristics, and may differ from other portfolios in the strategy due to asset size, client guidelines, and other variables. H&W selected the representative portfolio based on non-performance criteria. The portfolio reflects the management style of the strategy, is part of the strategy's composite, and has the longest continuous duration under the Adviser's discretion. Selection of the representative portfolio considers one or more of the following factors, such as the portfolio's investment guidelines/ restrictions, cash flow activity, or continuous duration under the Adviser's discretion. Based on the selection factors, the representative portfolio may change over the period shown.

Attribution is an analysis of a portfolio's gross of fee returns (without the deduction of fees and expenses) relative to the Index. Bloomberg calculates returns using daily holdings information. Returns calculated using this buy-and-hold methodology can differ from actual client portfolio returns due to data differences, cash flows, trading, and other activity (report is generated at a point in time and will not include any adjustments thereafter). Sector performance only covers the subset of investments specific to that sector. Analysis for different time periods and/or market environments can result in significantly different results.

Specific securities identified are the three largest contributors (or detractors) to the portfolio's performance, relative to the index. Other securities may have been the best and worst performers on an absolute basis. There is no assurance that the securities discussed will remain in the portfolio or that securities sold have not been repurchased. The securities discussed do not represent the entire portfolio, may only represent a small portion of the portfolio and should not assume the securities discussed were or will be profitable or that recommendations made in the future will be profitable or will equal the performance of the securities discussed. H&W's opinions regarding these securities are subject to change at any time, for any reason, without notice. Certain client portfolio(s) may or may not hold the securities discussed due to each account's guideline restrictions and other relevant considerations.

The value discipline used in managing accounts in the Mid-Cap Value strategy may prevent or limit investment in major stocks in the Russell Midcap Value and returns may not be correlated to the index. Composite performance is available at www.hwcm.com, located on the strategy's Performance tab; quarterly characteristics and portfolio holdings are located on the Portfolio and Literature tabs. For a list showing every holding's contribution to the overall account's performance and portfolio activity for a given time period, contact H&W at color@hwcm.com. Portfolio information is subject to the firm's portfolio holdings disclosure policy.

The Russell Midcap® Index, an unmanaged index, measures the performance of the 800 smallest companies in the Russell 1000® Index. The Russell Midcap® Value Index measures the performance of those Russell Midcap® companies with lower price-to-book value ratios and lower forecasted growth values. The Russell Midcap® Growth Index measures the performance of US midcap growth stocks. The S&P 500® Index is a broad-based unmanaged index of 500 stocks, which is widely recognized as representative of the equity market in general. Any indices and other financial benchmarks shown are provided for illustrative purposes only, are unmanaged, reflect reinvestment of income and dividends and do not reflect the impact of advisory fees. It is not possible to invest directly in an index.

Russell Investment Group is the source and owner of the Russell Index data contained herein (and all trademarks related thereto), which may not be redistributed. The information herein is not approved by Russell. H&W and Russell sectors are based on the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) by MSCI and S&P.

Artificial Intelligence (AI); Basis point (bp) is a unit equal to 1/100th of 1% and is used to denote the change in a financial instrument; **Beta** is a measure of a stock's volatility in relation to the overall market; **Brent Crude** oil is a major light, sweet crude oil extracted from offshore fields in the North Sea; **Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT)** measures a company's net income before income tax and interest expenses are deducted; **Dated Brent** is the daily physical spot price assessment for physical cargoes of North Sea crude oil that have been assigned a specific loading-date window for delivery; **Free cash flow** represents the cash a company generates after accounting for cash outflows to support operations and maintain its capital assets; **Normal Earnings** refers to a company's income that has been adjusted to remove revenue, expenses, or effects of seasonality; and **SaaSpocalypse** is a market term used to describe the sharp sell-off and valuation crash in software-as-a-service (SaaS) and enterprise tech stocks driven by fears of artificial intelligence disruption.

Information contained in this material may represent or be based on forward-looking statements. Due to various risks and uncertainties, actual events/results or performance of the strategy may differ materially from those reflected or contemplated in such forward-looking statements. Information based on forecasts, proprietary or third-party estimates cannot be guaranteed and are subject to change. Information obtained from independent sources is considered reliable, but H&W cannot guarantee its accuracy or completeness.

Investing in foreign as well as emerging markets involves additional risk such as greater volatility, political, economic, and currency risks and differences in accounting methods. Investing in smaller, medium-sized and/or newer companies involves greater risks not associated with investing in large company stocks, such as business risk, significant stock price fluctuations and illiquidity. A value-oriented investment approach involves the risk that value stocks may remain undervalued or may not appreciate in value as anticipated. Value stocks can perform differently from the market as a whole or from other types of stocks and may be out of favor with investors and underperform growth stocks for varying periods of time. Principal Risks Disclosure for the firm's strategies are described in Part 2A of Form ADV of H&W (www.hwcm.com/wp-content/uploads/HW-Principal-Risks.pdf).

Data source: H&W, Russell, Bloomberg

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GIPS Report:

Hotchkis and Wiley Capital Management, LLC (the "Firm" or "H&W") claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS standards. H&W has been independently verified for the periods October 9, 2001 through December 31, 2024. A firm that claims compliance with the GIPS standards must establish policies and procedures for complying with all the applicable requirements of the GIPS standards. Verification provides assurance on whether the firm's policies and procedures related to composite and pooled fund maintenance, as well as the calculation, presentation, and distribution of performance, have been designed in compliance with the GIPS standards and have been implemented on a firm-wide basis. The Mid-Cap Value Composite has had a performance examination for the periods January 1, 1997 through December 31, 2024. The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request.

H&W is an independent investment management firm registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and manages value equity and high yield assets for institutional and mutual fund investors. Its predecessor firm was established in 1980. The equity team of the predecessor firm established H&W in October 2001.

H&W refers to itself as a "registered investment adviser" in materials distributed to current and prospective clients. As a registered investment adviser with the SEC, H&W is subject to the rules and regulations adopted by the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the "Advisers Act"). Registration as an investment adviser is not an indication that H&W or its directors, officers, employees or representatives have attained a particular level of skill or ability.

Valuations and returns are stated in U.S. dollars. Investment returns include reinvestment of dividends, interest, and capital gains. Gross performance results are presented before management and custodial fees but after all trading expenses. Net performance results are presented after actual management fees and all trading expenses but before custodial fees. H&W's management fees are described in Part 2A of its Form ADV. The standard Mid-Cap Value management fee schedule is 75 basis points on the first $15 million, 70 basis points on the next $35 million and 65 basis points thereafter. Internal dispersion is calculated using the equal-weighted standard deviation of all portfolios (gross returns) that were included in the Composite for the entire year. A list of composite and broad distribution pooled fund descriptions and policies for valuing investments, calculating performance, and preparing GIPS Reports are available upon request. Past performance is no guarantee of future performance. GIPS® is a registered trademark of CFA Institute. CFA Institute does not endorse or promote this organization, nor does it warrant the accuracy or quality of the content contained herein.

Composite: The Composite includes all Mid-Cap Value discretionary accounts. The Mid-Cap Value strategy seeks capital appreciation primarily through investments in equity securities of mid-cap companies and may invest in the securities of small capitalization companies and in foreign (non-U.S.) securities. The typical market cap range of the strategy is consistent with the market cap range of the Russell Midcap® Index. Accounts with significant cash flows (≥ 10% of beginning of the month assets for the periods January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2010, and ≥ 25% effective January 1, 2011) are excluded from the respective month's composite calculation and included in the subsequent month. (Composite creation & inception date: 1/1/1997)

Index: The Russell Midcap® Value Index ("RMidcapV") measures the performance of those Russell Midcap® companies with lower price-to-book value ratios and lower forecasted growth values. The index assumes reinvestment of dividends and capital gains, and assumes no management, custody, transaction or other expenses. The value disciplines used in managing the accounts in the Composite may prevent or limit investment in major stocks in the RMidcapV and returns may not be correlated to the index. Benchmark returns are not covered by the report of independent verifiers.

The 3-year annualized standard deviation measures the variability of the composite (using gross returns) and the benchmark returns over the preceding 36-month period ended.

	% Total Return Gross of Fees	% Total Return Net of Fees	% Total Return RMidcapV	No. of Accts	Internal Dispersion (%)	Comp. Assets ($M)	Total Firm Assets ($M)
2025	9.0	8.1	11.0	<6	n/m	379	36,906
2024	4.7	3.9	13.1	<6	n/m	417	33,144
2023	21.1	20.2	12.7	<6	n/m	491	31,220
2022	2.6	1.9	-12.0	<6	n/m	491	28,330
2021	40.6	39.9	28.3	<6	n/m	993	34,902
2020	0.7	0.2	5.0	<6	n/m	746	31,687
2019	14.0	13.3	27.1	7	0.4	1,578	33,623
2018	-18.4	-18.9	-12.3	10	0.2	2,093	27,191
2017	8.9	8.2	13.3	13	0.2	3,235	32,037
2016	22.2	21.4	20.0	15	0.2	3,633	29,952

n/m–not considered meaningful for composites with five accounts or less for the full year.

3-Year Annualized Standard Deviation (%)		
	Composite	RMidcapV
2025	17.6	15.3
2024	23.1	19.8
2023	23.2	19.3
2022	35.3	24.4
2021	34.8	22.0
2020	35.5	22.6
2019	20.7	12.8
2018	19.0	12.0
2017	17.0	10.3
2016	17.3	11.3

As of December 31, 2025 (%)

	1 Yr	5 Yr	10 Yr
Composite - Gross	9.0	14.8	9.5
Composite - Net	8.1	14.0	8.8
RMidcapV	11.0	9.8	9.8

Average annual total returns for periods greater than one year.

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