
PROXY POLICY

OUR MANDATE

Our primary responsibility is to act as a fiduciary for our clients when voting proxies. We evaluate and vote each proposed proxy in a manner that maximizes long-term shareholder value.

There are instances such as unique client guidelines, regulatory requirements, share blocking, securities lending, or other technical limitations where we are unable to vote a particular proxy. In those instances where we do not have voting responsibility, we will generally forward our recommendation to such person our client designates.

OUR PROCESS

Analyst Role

To the extent we are asked to vote a client's proxy, our investment analysts are given the final authority on how to vote a particular proposal as these analysts' understanding of the company makes them the best person to apply our policy to a particular company's proxy ballot.

Voting Resources

To assist our analysts in their voting, we provide them with a report that compares the company's board of directors' recommendation against H&W's proxy policy guideline recommendation and with third-party proxy research (Institutional Shareholder Services "ISS" benchmarks) and third-party ESG analysis (Morgan Stanley Capital International "MSCI").

Engagement

As part of our normal due diligence and monitoring of investments, we engage management, board members, or their representatives on material business issues including environmental, social, and governance ("ESG") matters. Each proxy to be voted is an opportunity to give company management and board members formal feedback on these important matters.

If our policy recommendation is contrary to management's recommendation, our analyst is expected, but not required, to engage management. If the ballot issue is a materially important issue (i.e., the issue impacts the intrinsic value of the company), the analyst is required to engage with the company. Based on the engagement and the analyst's investment judgment, the analyst will submit a vote instruction to the Managing Director of Portfolio Services via email.

Collaboration

We are not "activists" and we do not form "groups" as defined by the SEC. However, we do engage with other institutional shareholders on important ESG proxy matters.

Exceptions To Policy

Any deviation from the H&W policy recommendation requires a written statement from the analyst that summarizes their decision to deviate from policy. Typical rationales include the issue raised is not material, the proposal is moot (e.g., the company already complies with proposal), the company has a credible plan to improve, policy does not fit unique circumstances of company, analyst's assessment of the issue is in-line with intent of policy, or the proposal usurps management's role in managing the company.

Exceptions to policy are reviewed annually by the ESG Investment Oversight Group.

Administration

The Managing Director of Portfolio Services coordinates the solicitation of analysts' votes, the collection of exception rationales, and the implementation of those votes by our third-party proxy advisor, ISS.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

All conflicts of interest are adjudicated based on what is deemed to be in the best interest of our clients and their beneficiaries. Our Proxy Oversight Committee ("POC") is responsible for reviewing proxies voted by the firm to determine that the vote was consistent with established guidelines in situations where potential conflicts of interests may exist when voting proxies. In general, when a conflict at the firm level presents itself, we will follow the recommendation of our third-party proxy advisor, ISS.

OVERSIGHT AND ROLES

ESG Investment Oversight Group

The ESG Investment Oversight Group is responsible for overseeing all ESG investment related issues. This mandate includes oversight of proxy voting policies and procedures as they relate to investment activity including the monitoring of proxy engagements, review of proxy voting exceptions and rationales, assessment of proxy voting issues, determination of ESG proxy goals, and education of investment staff on proxy matters. The group is staffed by members of the investment team and reports to the firm's Chief Executive Officer.

Proxy Oversight Committee

The Proxy Oversight Committee is responsible for overseeing proxy administration and conflicts of interest issues. The committee is comprised of the Chief Operating Officer, Chief Compliance Officer, the chair of the ESG Investment Oversight Group, and Managing Director of Portfolio Services. This group oversees H&W's proxy voting policies and procedures by

providing an administrative framework to facilitate and monitor the exercise of such proxy voting and to fulfill the obligations of reporting and recordkeeping under the federal securities laws. This committee manages our third-party proxy advisory relationship.

Investment Analyst

The investment analyst is responsible for analyzing and voting all proxies. The investment analyst has the final authority on individual proxy votes. The ESG Investment Oversight Group has final authority on creating and amending the proxy policy.

VOTING GUIDELINES

This section summarizes our stance on important issues that are commonly found on proxy ballots, though each vote is unique and there will be occasional exceptions to these guidelines. The purpose of our proxy guidelines is to ensure decision making is consistent with our responsibilities as a fiduciary.

These guidelines are divided into seven categories based on issues that frequently appear on proxy ballots.

- Boards and Directors
- Environmental and Social Matters
- Auditors and Related Matters
- Shareholder Rights
- Capital and Restructuring
- Executive and Board Compensation
- Routine and Miscellaneous Matters

Boards and Directors

Board Independence

We believe an independent board is crucial to protecting and serving the interests of public shareholders. We will generally withhold from or vote against any insiders when such insider sits on the audit, compensation, or nominating committees; or if independent directors comprise less than 50% of the board. Insiders are non-independent directors who may have inherent conflicts of interest that could prevent them from acting in the best interest of shareholders. Examples of non-independent directors include current and former company executives, persons with personal or professional relationships with the company and or its executives, and shareholders with large ownership positions.

Board Composition

We believe directors should attend meetings, be focused on the company, be responsive to shareholders, and be accountable for their decisions.

We will generally withhold from or vote against directors who attend less than 75% of meetings held during their tenure without just cause, sit on more than 5 public company boards (for CEOs only 2 outside boards), support measures that limit shareholder rights, or fail to act on shareholder proposals that passed with a majority of votes.

Board Diversity & DEI Matters

For shareholder proposals concerning DEI issues, we generally follow management's recommendations unless our analyst identifies a significant deficiency in this area.

Board Size

We do not see a standard number of directors that is ideal for all companies. In general, we do not want to see board sizes changed without shareholder approval as changing board size can be abused in the context of a takeover battle.

Board Tenure

In general, we will evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether the board is adequately refreshed with new talent and the proposed changes are not designed to reduce board independence.

Classified Boards

We oppose classified boards because, among other things, it can make change in control more difficult to achieve and limit shareholder rights by reducing board accountability.

Cumulative Voting

Generally, we oppose cumulative voting because we believe that economic interests and voting interests should be aligned in most circumstances.

Independent Board Chair

Generally, we favor a separate independent chair that is not filled by an insider. If the CEO is also the board chair, we require 2/3 of the board to be independent, a strong independent director (i.e., has formal input on board agendas and can call/preside over meetings of independent directors), and the CEO cannot serve on the nominating or compensation committees.

Proxy Contests

Proxy contests are unusual events that require a case-by-case assessment of the unique facts and circumstances of each contested proxy campaign. Our policy is to defer to the judgement of our analysts on what best serves our clients' interests. Our analysts will evaluate the validity of the dissident's concerns, the likelihood that the dissident plan will improve shareholder value, the qualifications of the dissident's candidates, and management's historical record of creating or destroying shareholder value.

Risk Oversight

Generally, companies should have established processes for managing material threats to their businesses, including ESG risks. We encourage transparency and vote to improve transparency to help facilitate appropriate risk oversight.

Environmental and Social Matters

We believe the oversight of all material risks, including environmental and social risks, that may affect future earnings, cash flow, and liabilities is an important responsibility of the board of directors and essential to a well-managed company. We evaluate shareholder proposals related to environmental and social matters on a case-by-case basis to assess the issue's materiality and potential impact on the business's economic value.

Auditors and Related Matters

Generally, we will support the board's recommendation of auditors provided that the auditors are independent, non-audit fees are less than the sum of all audit and tax related fees, and there are no indications of fraud or misleading audit opinions.

Shareholder Rights

We do not support proposals that limit shareholder rights. When a company chronically underperforms minimal expectations due to poor execution, poor strategic decisions, or poor capital allocation, there may arise the need for shareholders to effect change at the board level. Proposals that have the effect of entrenching boards or managements, thwarting the will of the majority of shareholders, or advantaging one class of shareholders at the expense of other shareholders will not be supported.

Amendment to Charter/Articles/Bylaws

We do not support proposals that give the board exclusive authority to amend the bylaws. We believe amendments to charter/articles/bylaws should be approved by a vote of the majority of shareholders.

One Share, One Vote

Generally, we do not support proposals to create dual class voting structures that give one set of shareholders super voting rights that are disproportionate from their economic interest in the company. Generally, we will support proposals to eliminate dual class structures.

Poison Pills

In general, we do not support anti-takeover measures such as poison pills. Such actions can lead to outcomes that are not in shareholders' best interests and impede maximum shareholder returns. It can also lead to management entrenchment. We may support poison pills intended to protect NOL assets.

Proxy Access

Generally, we support proposals that enable shareholders with an ownership level of 3% for a period of three years or more, or an ownership level of 10% and a holding period of one year or more.

Right to Act by Written Consent

We believe that shareholders should have the right to solicit votes by written consent in certain circumstances. These circumstances generally include but are not limited to situations where more than a narrow group of shareholders support the cause to avoid unnecessary resource waste, the proposal does not exclude minority shareholders to the benefit of a large/majority shareholder, and shareholders receive more than 50% support to set up action by written consent.

Special Meetings

Generally, we support proposals that enable shareholders to call a special meeting provided shareholders own at least 15% of the outstanding shares.

Virtual Meetings

We believe shareholders should have the opportunity to participate in the annual and special meetings, as current communications technology such as video conferencing is broadly available to facilitate such interactions. This improves shareholders' ability to hear directly from management and the board of the directors, and to provide feedback as needed.

Capital and Restructuring

Events such as takeover offers, buyouts, mergers, asset purchases and sales, corporate restructuring, recapitalizations, dilutive equity issuance, or other major corporate events are considered by our analysts on a case-by-case basis. Our policy is to vote for transactions that maximize the long-term risk adjusted return to shareholders considering management's historical record of creating shareholder value, the likelihood of success, and the risk of not supporting the proposal.

Dual Class Shares

We do not support dual class shares unless the economic and voting interests are equal.

Issuance of Common Stock

In general, we will consider the issuance of additional shares in light of the stated purpose, the magnitude of the increase, the company's historical shareholder value creation, and historical use of shares. We are less likely to support issuance when discounts or re-pricing of options has been an issue in the past.

Executive and Board Compensation

We expect the board of directors to design, implement, and monitor pay practices that promote pay-for-performance, alignment of interest with long-term shareholder value creation, retention and attraction of key employees. In general, we will evaluate executive compensation in light of historical value creation, peer group pay practices, and our view on management's stewardship of the company.

We expect the board of directors to maintain an independent and effective compensation committee that has members with the appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and ability to access third-party advice.

We expect the board of directors to provide shareholders with clear and understandable compensation disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate the effectiveness and fairness of executive pay packages.

And finally, we expect the board of directors' own compensation to be reasonable and not set at a level that undermines their independence from management.

Golden Parachutes

Golden parachutes can serve as encouragement to management to consider transactions that benefit shareholders; however, substantial payouts may present a conflict of interest where management is incentivized to support a suboptimal deal. We view cash severance greater than 3x base salary and bonus to be excessive unless approved by a majority of shareholders in a say-on-pay advisory vote.

Incentive Options and Repricing

We generally support long-term incentive programs tied to pay-for-performance. In general, we believe 50% or more of top executive pay should be tied to long-term performance goals and that those goals should be tied to shareholder value creation metrics. We do not support plans that reset when management fails to attain goals or require more than 10% of outstanding shares to be issued. In general, we do not support the exchange or repricing of options.

Say-on-Pay

We believe annual say-on-pay votes are an effective mechanism to provide feedback to the board on executive pay and performance. We support non-binding proposals that are worded in a manner such that the actual implementation of the plan is not restricted. In general, we will vote against plans where there is a serious misalignment of CEO pay and performance or the company maintains problematic pay practices. In general, we will withhold votes from members of the compensation committee if there is no say-on-pay on the ballot, the board fails to respond to a previous say-on-pay proposal that received less than 70% support, the company has implemented problematic pay practices such as repricing options or its pay plans are egregious.

Routine and Miscellaneous Matters

We generally support routine board proposals such as updating bylaws (provided they are of a housekeeping nature), change of the corporate name or change of the time or location of the annual meeting.

Adjournment of Meeting

We do not support proposals that give management the authority to adjourn a special meeting absent compelling reasons to support the proposal.

Amend Quorum Requirements

We do not support proposals to reduce quorum requirements for shareholder meetings without support from a majority of the shares outstanding without compelling justification.

Other Business

We do not support proposals on matters where we have not been provided sufficient opportunity to review the matters at hand.